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"Since the Euro crisis began, Germany has emerged as Europe's dominant power. During the last few years, German chancellor Angela Merkel has been compared with Bismarck and even Hitler in the European media. And yet few can deny that Germany today is very different from the stereotype of nineteenth- and twentieth-century. After nearly seventy years of struggling with the Nazi past, Germans believe that they more than anyone have learned its lessons. Above all, what the new Germany aspires to stand for is peace. Germany is unique in this combination of economic assertiveness and military abstinence. So what does it mean to have a "German Europe" in the twenty-first century? In 'The paradox of German Power', Hans Kundnani explains how Germany got to where it is now and where it might go in the future. He explores German national identity and foreign policy through a series of tensions in German thinking and action: between continuity and change, between "normality" and "abnormality," between economics and politics, and between Europe and the world." -- Publisher

Ist ein "deutsches Europa" die bittere Frucht der europäischen Krise? In vielen europäischen Ländern wird es so wahrgenommen. Angela Merkel wird mit Hitler verglichen, die Rede ist von deutscher "Hegemonie" und einem neuen deutschen "Reich". Doch Deutschland ist heute ein anderes Land als im 19. Oder 20. Jahrhundert. Nur - welches? Einmal mehr könnte es zu einer Quelle der Instabilität im Herzen Europas werden. In German Power geht Hans Kundnani der Transformation Deutschlands seit der Vereinigung 1990 nach und stellt sie in den Kontext der deutschen Geschichte vor 1945. Dabei zeigt er Ähnlichkeiten auf und benennt einige Grundkonflikte - zwischen Kontinuität und Wandel, Ökonomie und Politik, Europa und der Welt. Kundnani kommt in seinem provozierenden Essay zu dem unbequemen Schluss, dass die "deutsche Frage" wieder zurückgekehrt ist - in geoökonomischer Gestalt. (Verlagstext)

Kindleberger's theory of hegemonic stability states that fixed
exchange rate regimes require a leader that will provide it with disproportionate
resources to ensure stability. Applying his theory to European monetary
cooperation, we argue that, like the tools of Goethe's "Sorcerer's Apprentice,"
European Monetary Union was constructed as a "self-regulating system," and
it threatens to run amok without a hegemonic leader. Germany has exercised
"soft hegemony" in Europe, providing the European Union with disproportionate
resources to stabilize the single market. It has the capability to be the
Eurozone's leader. But, by 2017, blinded by its ordoliberal ideology, i t refused
to do so, instead placing the burden of cooperation on the weak. If Germany
continues to refuse to play the role of the hegemonic leader, European Monetary
Union faces collapse.

Intro -- Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- About the Author -- Abbreviations -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- Framing the Context -- State of Research -- Theorising Member States' Influence -- Power and the European Union -- A Taxonomy of Power -- Research Design and Methodology -- Case Studies -- Chapter 2: The Russian-Georgian War 2008: Germany as a Junior Partner -- German Positions and Preferences -- Opposing NATO Membership Action Plan for Georgia -- Setting the Agenda in Abkhazia -- Crisis Mediation -- Conflict Phase I: Supporting France's Conflict Mediation -- Conflict Phase II: Keeping the EU Together -- Conflict Phase III: Return to Business-as-Usual -- Sanctions Policy -- Explaining the Final Outcome -- German Influence -- Alternative Influences I (EU Actors and Member States) -- Alternative Influences II (Russia, US, External Shocks) -- Conclusion: Germany as a Junior Partner -- Chapter 3: The EU-Russia Partnership for Modernisation 2010: Germany as Agenda-Setter -- German Positions and Preferences -- Policy Initiation (EU Level) -- Policy Initiation (Member State Level) -- Explaining the Final Outcome -- German Influence -- Alternative Influences I (EU Actors and Member States) -- Alternative Influences II (Russia, US, External Shocks) -- Conclusion: Germany as Agenda-Setter -- Chapter 4: The Meseberg Initiative 2010: Germany as a Deal-Maker -- German Positions and Preferences -- Responding to Medvedev's Proposals -- Moldova as a Test Case -- Policy Initiation (Bilateral Level) -- Policy Initiation (EU Level) -- Policy Implementation -- Explaining the Final Outcome -- German Influence -- Alternative Influences I (EU Actors and Member States) -- Alternative Influences II (Russia, Moldova, US, External Shocks) -- Conclusion: Germany as a Deal-Maker.